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I. INTRODUCTION
In the quest for profits, the pharmaceutical industry is one of the
leaders in the United States economy. As a consequence of the high
profits available, patients benefit from the availability of an ever
increasing array of drugs to treat the illnesses and injuries that affect
everyone. 1 However, developing and manufacturing drugs are not
always profitable for drug companies where the drugs will treat
diseases that do not affect many people.2 The drugs that treat rare
1. See H.R. REP. No. 97-840, pt. 1, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3577,
3578 [hereinafter ORPHAN DRUG ACT REPORT] (report on P.L. 97-414 Orphan Drug Act).
2. See id.
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diseases have come to be known as "orphan drugs,"3 a reference to
the unwillingness of drug companies to "adopt" these drugs and take
them through the lengthy and expensive Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval process that is required before they
can be sold in the U.S.4 Before 1983, the development of these drugs
was left to the benevolence of the drug companies, who would
occasionally develop them as a public service. 5
In 1983, however, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act.6 The
Act was designed to encourage the development of orphan drugs
through a series of economic incentives and special assistance with
the drug approval process. The Act has been extremely successful,
leading to enormous increases in the number of drugs that are
available to treat rare diseases. In the decade preceding the passage of
the Act, only ten orphan drugs were approved and developed without
substantial federal support;7 in the fourteen years since, that number
has increased to 144.8 However, like any legislation, the Act also has
3. Id. Technically, the proper term is the more general "orphan product," which can refer
to a drug, an antibiotic, or a biological product; these three categories receive an approval, a
certification, or a license, respectively. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(1) (1994). For simplicity, this
Article uses "orphan drug" and "approval" throughout; the term is to be taken to mean any of the
three categories of orphan products.
4. See generally Louis Lasagne, Who Will Adopt the Orphan Drugs?, 3 REGULATION 27
(1979); see also CAROLYN H. ASBURY, ORPHAN DRUGS: MEDICAL VERSUS MARKET VALUE
(1985). Dr. Asbury's book provides an excellent in-depth discussion of the situation leading up
to the passage of the Orphan Drug Act.
5. See Peter S. Amo et al. Rare Diseases, Drug Development, and AIDS: The Impact of
the Orphan Drug Act, 73 MILBANK Q. 231,232-33 (1995) (discussing public service drugs).
6. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1994), 26 U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. II 1994), 42 U.S.C. § 236 (1994)).
7. See Carolyn H. Asbury, Evolution and Current Status of the Orphan Drug Act, 8 INT'L
J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 573, 576 (1992); Li-Hsien Rin-Laures & Diane Janofsky,
Recent Developments Concerning the Orphan Drug Act, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269, 270
(1991); see generally Office of Orphan Products Development (visited Mar. 27, 1997)
<http://vww.fda.govllorphanindex.htm>. This Web site, maintained by the FDA's Office of
Orphan Products Development, is an excellent source of information about the Orphan Drug
Act.
8. See List of Orphan Designations and Approvals (visited Apr. 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.fda.govllorphanl DESIGNAT/list.htm> (listing all designated and approved orphan
drugs under the Act); see Orphan Products Approved for Marketing (visited Apr. 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.fda.gov/orphan/DESIGNAT/recent.htm> (listing the approvals in the last 12
months, 24 approvals as of Mar. 27, 1997). At least one company now specializes in marketing
orphan products under the Orphan Drug Act. See Orphan Products Company (visited Apr. 12,
1999) <http://www.orphan.com> (Web site of Orphan Products Company); see also John
Henkel, Orphan Products: New Hope for People with Rare Disorders, FDA CONSUMER
SPECIAL REPORT ON NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1995) available at
<http:lwww.fda.govllfdac/special/ newdrug/orphan.html> ("Some companies have even sprung
up to develop and market orphan drugs exclusively.").
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generated its share of controversy. A few critics have questioned the
need for the Act, despite the overwhelming evidence of its success. 9
However, most of the criticism has centered around a few orphan
drugs that are manufactured by a few companies, drugs that are
immensely profitable, despite the underlying premise of the Act that
orphan drugs would not be profitable at all. 10 These profitable
orphans have led to what has become almost an annual event in
Congress: attempts to amend the Orphan Drug Act.11 However, to
date, none of these amendments has succeeded in changing the basic
incentive structure of the Act.12
Part II of this article discusses the background and history of the
Orphan Drug Act and the provisions that currently comprise it. Part
I1 also examines the regulations that were finally instituted in 1993,
almost ten years after the passage of the original Act, and their impact
on the Act. Part Im analyzes the attempts to amend the Act. Finally,
part IV analyzes some of the criticism of the Act and explains why
most of this criticism is an overreaction to what has been a relatively
small problem. Part IV also discusses the few cases that have
addressed the Act and explores other proposed uses of the incentive
system of the Act. Part V concludes with the assertion that it is
unnecessary - and probably dangerous - to repair an Act that is
working so well already.
II. THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT
The Orphan Drug Act was passed in 1982 and went into effect in
1983.13 It was amended in 1984,14 1985,15 and 1988.16 Congress has
made various other attempts to amend the Act (the closest to success
9. See, e.g. Amo et aL., supra note 5, at 245 (questioning the need for high returns in the
pharmaceutical industry).
10. See, e.g., Arno et al., supra note 5, at 232; John J. Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An
Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389 (1992); Rin-Laures &
Janofsky, supra note 7, at 269, 293, 297.
11. See, e.g., S. 2576, 101st Cong. (1990) and H.R. 4638, 101st Cong. (1990) (Orphan
Drug Amendments of 1990); S. 1981, 103rd Cong. (1994) and H.R. 4160, 103rd Cong. (1994)
(Orphan Drug Act Amendments of 1994).
12. The Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990 did pass both houses of Congress, but they
were pocket vetoed by President Bush. See 137 CONG. REc. H73 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991) (H.R.
4638-Memorandum of Disapproval).
13. The Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1994), 26 U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. I 1994), 42 U.S.C. § 236 (1994)).
14. Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-551,
98 Stat. 2815 (1984).
15. Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (1985).
16. Orphan Drug Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-290, 102 Stat. 90 (1988).
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in 1990)17; the provisions of these failed Amendments are discussed
in part III, infra. The FDA finally formalized the Regulations under
the Act in 1993.18 Part I.A provides the background of the problems
that cause some drugs to become orphans. Part II.B traces the
chronology of the various parts of the Act and the Regulations. Part
II.C then discusses the specific provisions of the current Act, while
part II.D discusses the Regulations.
A. Background
The root of the orphan drug problem lies in the complex and
costly FDA drug approval process. Before the 1960s, drug approval
was a relatively simple process, requiring only a demonstration that
the compound in question was safe and that it was labeled properly.19
However, in 1962 Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act to require a showing of efficacy in addition to safety.20 This led
to the creation of the modem drug approval process.
The FDA requires many difficult steps in a drug's long journey
from the laboratory to the pharmacy. Once a drug with a potentially
therapeutic effect has been found, it must first be tested in animals for
both safety and efficacy.21 This process is very time-consuming.
When the drug has passed the animal hurdle, it must then go through
three levels of testing in humans to demonstrate again its safety and
efficacy. In many cases, post-marketing testing is required as well.22
After completing all of these hurdles, drug companies must then
compile all of the information and submit it to the FDA to obtain
approval. This compilation process is anything but easy; drug
approval applications can be tens of thousands of pages long.23 Over
time, the FDA has become more and more demanding, requiring
additional information at each of these levels. All of this is after the
enormous investment of money and effort that is required even to
17. See S. 2576, 101st Cong. (1990) and H.R. 4638, 101st Cong. (1990) (Orphan Drug
Amendments of 1990).
18. 21 C.F.R. pt. 316 (1998).
19. See LISA RUBY BASARA & MICHAEL MONTAGNE, SEARCHING FOR MAGIC BULLETS
78 (1994).
20. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781,76 Stat. 780 (1962). For a history
of the drug approval process in the U.S., see ASBURY, supra note 4, at 7-45. See also BASARA
& MONTAGNE, supra note 19, at 77-108.
21. See BASARA & MONTAGNE, supra note 19, at 85-98.
22. See BASARA & MONTAGNE, supra note 19, at 97-98; Veronica Henry, Problems with
Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 620-22 (1993); see
generally ASBURY, supra note 4, at 7-45.
23. See Henry, supra note 22, at 622.
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identify potential drug candidates. Thus, drug development is a very
expensive and time-consuming process. Estimates vary widely, but in
general it costs on average over $300 million and takes more than ten
years to bring a drug to market. 24
For most drugs that are designed to treat conditions affecting
many people, these costs can be recovered in the sales of the drug.
The profitability of such drugs is enhanced since almost all of them
are patented, which gives the maker exclusive marketing rights.
Large markets and patents are sufficient incentives for the
development of most drugs.25
Drugs for rare conditions that affect very few people in the
United States are different. The market for these drugs may be so
small that the manufacturer has no expectation of recovering the costs
of developing the drug.26 Further complicating the development
process is the fact that these drugs affect so few people that designing
effective clinical trial protocols is particularly difficult (although this
sometimes makes the drugs less expensive to develop, as the FDA
often allows manufacturers to use fewer subjects in trials of drugs for
rare diseases). The cost-recovery problem is exacerbated by the fact
that many of these drugs are already known to have the desired effect
on the rare disease, and hence are not eligible for either product or use
patents.27 Thus, in the past, drug companies were reluctant to develop
these drugs, since without patent protection they were vulnerable to
certain types of competition. After a drug company made an
investment in the testing required to get approval of a drug, copycat
drug makers who did not incur the testing and approval costs could
easily underprice them. Without the assurance of a protected market,
especially when the market itself was so small, the only reason to
develop these drugs was as a public service. The drugs that were
24. See, e.g., George Anders, Vital Statistic: Disputed Cost of Creating a Drug, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 9, 1993, at BI (presenting a range of $129 million after taxes to $500 million before
taxes; Office of Technology Assessment reports $359 million before taxes); Henry, supra note
22, at 617 ($231 million).
25. See generally Peter Temin, Technology, Regulation and Market Structure in the
Modem Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 BELL J. ECON. 429,435-41 (1979).
26. See Marlene E. Haffner & John V. Kelsey, Evaluation of Orphan Products by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, 8 INTL J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 647, 647-648
(1992). Dr. Haffner is the Head of the FDA's Office of Orphan Products Development.
27. See Asbury, supra note 7, at 575 (noting that some orphan drugs are not patentable
because they are "shelf chemicals, natural substances, products whose patents had already
expired, [or] 'known' through publication"). Researchers (often in universities) discovered the
effect of many orphan drugs on their respective diseases, but without the Act, drug companies
did not find these drugs worth developing or patenting. The failure to file a patent application
before publication resulted in the eventual loss of potential patent rights.
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already known to be effective for treating rare diseases were called
"orphan drugs" because drug companies were unwilling to adopt them
and take them through the FDA's drug approval process. 28
While the individual diseases may be rare, enough of these rare
diseases exist that in the aggregate that they affect between ten and
twenty million people in the U.S.29 Thus, in the early 1980s,
Congress began to take an interest in resolving the orphan drug
problem.30 This Congressional interest culminated in the Orphan
Drug Act of 1983.31 One of the major driving forces behind the
legislation was the National Organization for Rare Diseases (NORD),
led by its chairperson, Abbey Meyers. 32 However, the event that
finally catalyzed the passage of the Act was the public outcry
following the broadcast of an episode of the television show Quincy,
M.E. in March 1981.33 This episode dealt with a boy with Tourette's
Syndrome, a classic orphan disease. Such was the power of the
episode (and the public sentiment that followed it) that Congress
passed the Act by an overwhelming majority.
B. Chronology
1. The 1983 Act
Congressional hearings and proposals on orphan drugs began as
early as 1980, and the original Orphan Drug Act was finally passed in
December 1982.34 The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 laid out the basic
elements of the Act that persist today.
The Act first defined an orphan drug as one that was useful for a
28. See Asbury, supra note 7, at 575.
29. See Marlene E. Haffner, Orphan Products: Origins, Progress, and Prospects, 31
ANN. REV. PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 603, 603 (1991) (quoting the 1989 Report of the
National Commission on Orphan Diseases).
30. See Asbury, supra note 7, at 576 (discussing Congressional hearings on H.R. 7089 in
1980).
31. Pub. L. No. 97-414,96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-
360ee (1994), 26 U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. II 1994), 42 U.S.C. § 236 (1994)).
32. See Abbey S. Meyers, The Impact of Orphan Drug Regulation on Patients and
Availability, 47 FOOD DRUG & COSMETIC L.J. 9, 9 (1992). For more information on NORD
and the amazing work it does for people with rare diseases, see <http://www.rarediseases.org>.
33. See ASBURY, supra note 4, at 111-12, 124-26, 166. See also BASARA & MONTAGNE,
supra note 19, at 133-34 (pointing out that many other people were also deeply involved in
persuading Congress to pass the Orphan Drug Act). The star of Quincy, Jack Klugman, actually
testified at the House of Representatives' Hearings on the Orphan Drug Act. For a fascinating
discussion of the crucial role played by Klugman and Quincy.
34. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1994)).
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condition that was "rare in the United States."
[T]he term "rare disease or condition" means any disease or
condition which occurs so infrequently in the United States that there
is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making
available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will
be recovered from sales in the United States of such drug.35
Congress intentionally left this definition vague, giving
instructions for the FDA to define orphan drugs more precisely.
Congress gave the FDA guidance in the Findings that accompanied
the ACt:
The Findings state [sic] that when a disease or condition occurs
infrequently, so that the sponsor of a drug has no reasonable
expectation of its sales generating sufficient revenues to offset the
costs of development, the disease or condition is probably "rare"
enough to discourage development. This statement is not intended
to establish a test of the "commercial value" of a drug, but rather to
direct FDA to the incidence of the disease and whether the
expected low use of a drug is the determining factor in whether
drug development will occur.36
Thus, under the original version of the Act, an orphan drug was
defined as one for which there was "no reasonable expectation that
the cost of developing.. . will be recovered from sales in the United
States of such drug."37  To qualify for the market exclusivity
incentive, the drug also had to be unpatented and unpatentable, since
a patent was thought to give sufficient protection without the need for
the incentives of the Act. 38 A drug that met this definition was to be
given "designation" as an orphan drug, which entitled the
manufacturer to take advantage of the Act's incentives. 39  Any
number of sponsors could obtain designation for the same drug for the
35. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 526(a)(2), 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1994)).
36. ORPHAN DRUG ACT REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
37. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 526(a)(2), 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1994)).
38. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 527(a), 96 Stat. 2049 (1982); see
generally Sheila R. Shulman et al., Implementation of the Orphan Drug Act: 1983-1991, 47
FOOD & DRUG LJ. 363, 364 (1992); ORPHAN DRUG AT REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7.
39. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 526, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bb (1994). Currently, approximately 660 drugs have been
designated under the Act. See OOPD Frequently Asked Questions (visited Apr. 12, 1999)
<http:llwww.fda.govllorphanlfaq/index.htm>. See List of Orphan Designations and Approvals
(visited Apr. 12, 1999) <http:lwww.fda.govllorphanl DESIGNATfiist.htm> (listing all
designated and approved orphan drugs under the Act).
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same indication. However, only the first one to receive FDA
marketing approval, gained by successfully completing clinical trials,
was entitled to receive market exclusivity. Any particular drug could
qualify for exclusivity for treating any number of different diseases or
indications. 40 Additionally, any particular disease or indication could
have any number of drugs for treating it qualify for exclusivity. The
sole limitation was that only one manufacturer could obtain
exclusivity for any given drug for any given indication, since
otherwise "exclusivity" would be meaningless. 41
The details of the incentives are discussed in part II.C, infra.
Briefly, the Act provided: (1) assistance from the FDA in designing
clinical trials for orphan drugs; (2) seven years of market exclusivity
for orphan drugs; (3) open clinical trial protocols to increase
availability of experimental orphan drugs; (4) the creation of an
Orphan Products Board to coordinate the government's orphan drug
programs; (5) tax credits for clinical trials of orphan drugs; and (6)
grant funds for orphan drug research and clinical trials.42
2. The 1984 Amendments
The response to the 1983 Orphan Drug Act was
underwhelming. 43  Drug manufacturers were reluctant to incur the
costs of compiling the production-cost information that was needed to
demonstrate the lack of commercial feasibility, and they were even
more reluctant to share this sensitive information with the FDA. In
response, Congress passed the 1984 Amendments, 44 establishing a
bright-line rule which defined an orphan drug as one for a disease that
affected fewer than 200,000 people in the U.S. Congress also
maintained the previous definition for drugs that had costs which
could not be recovered by sales. This test was to be used for drugs
that affected more than 200,000 people. This is the definition
currently used in the Orphan Drug Act.45
40. See Shulman et al., supra note 38, at 370.
41. See Shulman et al., supra note 38, at 370-71 (giving specific examples of both of these
situations).
42. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1994), 26 U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. HI 1994), 42 U.S.C.
§ 236 (1994).
43. See Stephan E. Lawton, Controversy Under the Orphan Drug Act: Is Resolution on
the Way?, 46 FoOD DRUG & COSMETIC L.J. 327, 329 (quoting Edward Brandt, Assistant
Secretary of Health, Department of Health and Human Services); see also Shulman et al., supra
note 38, at 365; Asbury, supra note 7, at 578.
44. Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-551,
98 Stat. 2815 (1984).
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1994).
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3. The 1985 Amendments
The most important aspects of the 1985 Amendments to the
Orphan Drug Act addressed the unpatentability requirement. 46 The
requirement that the drug be unpatented and unpatentable created
problems in several types of situations.47 First, some drugs were
patented, but their patent terms were set to expire in less than seven
years, the market exclusivity period under the Act. Under the existing
Act, such drugs did not receive the full seven years of market
exclusivity, one of the main incentives under the Act. In some cases,
the FDA delayed approval until the patent term expired, but this was a
poor solution because the purpose of the Act was to get orphan drugs
to patients who needed them as quickly as possible; the delay was
particularly problematic when the remaining patent term was several
years. Second, deciding whether or not a drug was "patentable" could
be a very difficult and time-consuming endeavor,48 even with the
assistance of the Patent and Trademark Office. 49 This situation again
led to excessive and unnecessary delays in the approval of orphan
drugs. Congress elected to address this problem by simply removing
the requirement that the drug be unpatented and unpatentable.50
The 1985 Amendments also made some other minor changes to
the Orphan Drug Act. The Act was expanded to include antibiotics
(the original Act covered only traditional pharmaceuticals and
biologics such as vaccine sera), necessitating minor wording changes
throughout the Act. The Amendments also expanded the availability
of research grants to cover all "qualified testing" rather than just
"qualified clinical testing" and reauthorized these grants for three
more years.
.4. The 1988 Amendments
The 1988 Amendments 51 were less significant than the previous
Amendments. Congress was concerned with perceived problems with
the Orphan Drug Act, and some Congresspersons called for drastic
46. See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (1985).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 99-153, at 3 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 301, 302-03
(report on P.L. 99-91 Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985).
48. See Arno et al., supra note 5, at 234.
49. See Memorandum of Understanding with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 49 Fed. Reg. 13589 (1984) (PTO-to assist FDA in determining patentability of orphan
drugs).
50. See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (1985).
51. Orphan Drug Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-290, 102 Stat. 90 (1988).
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reform.52 However, Congress decided to reauthorize the Act before
some of its provisions (especially the grant appropriations) expired.
Congress at that time chose to defer major changes. Most of the 1988
changes simply repaired minor errors. A 1993 Amendment similarly
corrected some very minor technical errors.53
The 1988 Amendments did make two substantive changes. First,
the Act was amended to require that the sponsor file the request for
orphan drug designation before submitting an application for drug
marketing approval. 54 Second, a new provision required that orphan
drug manufacturers notify the FDA at least one year before
discontinuing production of an approved orphan drug product.55 This
time lag gives the FDA time to find another manufacturer for the
drug.56 Holders of orphan drug designations for drugs that are not yet
approved for sale were also required to notify the FDA when they
were no longer actively pursuing FDA approval.57
5. The 1993 Regulations
In January 1991, the FDA finally proposed the regulations under
which it would administer the Orphan Drug Act.58 These regulations
established the process for obtaining orphan drug designation and
explained what information would be required under both parts of the
orphan drug definition (the "less than 200,000 affected" and "no
reasonable expectation of cost recovery" prongs). The regulations
resolved the long-standing problem of under what circumstances two
drugs would be considered "different" for the purposes of market
exclusivity. They also made an attempt to define when different
medical conditions represent different drug markets. After a period of
comment, these Regulations went into effect, with only slight
modifications, in January 1993 - almost ten years after the original
passage of the Orphan Drug Act.59
52. See Cynthia A. Thomas, Re-Assessing the Orphan Drug Act, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 413,435-36 (1990); Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 275-76.
53. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-80,
107 Stat. 773 (1993).
54. See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-290, 102 Stat. 90 (1988)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(1) (1994)).
55. See id. § 360bb(b)(1) (1994).
56. See Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 276.
57. See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-290, 102 Stat. 90 (1988)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(b)(2) (1994)).
58. 56 Fed. Reg. 3338 (1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316) (proposed Jan. 29,
1991).
59. Orphan Drugs, 57 Fed. Reg. 62076 (1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316).
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C. Orphan Drug Act Provisions
The Orphan Drug Act provides manufacturers with six main
areas of assistance in developing orphan drugs. Three of these are
direct economic incentives, while the other three primarily facilitate
the development process.
1. Protocol Assistance
The first incentive provided in the Orphan Drug Act was
assistance with investigations of orphan drugs.60 As discussed in part
I.A, supra, the FDA approval process is very complex and costly. It
is often made even more costly because drug manufacturers do not
always know in advance the date requirements of the FDA for
granting approval. To reduce this problem, the Act provides for
orphan drug sponsors to receive assistance directly from the FDA on
exactly what tests and experiments the sponsors need to complete in
order to secure drug marketing approval. This assistance is especially
helpful with orphan drugs, since the diseases that these drugs treat
affect so few people that drug companies face particular difficulties in
designing effective clinical trials. 61
2. Marketing Exclusivity
The second incentive is the most significant incentive, and also
the most controversial. The Orphan Drug Act provides for a seven-
year period of market exclusivity for orphan drugs.62 This provision
takes advantage of the FDA's role in approving pharmaceutical
products. 63 Normally, the only way to protect the market for a
product or treatment is by obtaining a patent. However, another form
of protection is available for drugs. Since the FDA must approve all
drugs before they can be sold in the U.S., the FDA can protect the
market for a drug simply by refusing to approve the applications of
competing drugs. Congress has taken advantage of this special form
of market protection in the Orphan Drug Act. The Act provides that
the FDA cannot approve a marketing application for the same orphan
drug that treats the same orphan condition for seven years from the
date of the approval of the first orphan drug application. The effect of
this provision is to confer a monopoly of seven years to the first
sponsor with an approved application.
60. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aa (1994).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 97-840, pt. 1, at7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3577.
62. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ce (1994).
63. See supra Part II.A.
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The Act provides for two exceptions to this rule. The first is that
if the FDA finds that the sponsor cannot produce enough of the drug
to meet the demand for it, the exclusivity is revoked. 64 This provision
is a required safety valve, although it has not yet been invoked.
Second, the holder of the marketing exclusion can voluntarily consent
in writing to the approval of another application. 65 This provision has
been used and it provides an important mechanism whereby drug
manufacturers can arrange their business dealings with each other.
This provision was originally intended to compensate for a lack
of patent protection. 66 Consequently, it was written to apply only to
drugs that could not be or were no longer patented. However, this
proved to be unworkable, and the 1985 Amendments removed this
requirement.
The market exclusivity provision has proven to be quite
controversial. For the most part, it has been very successful in
protecting orphan drugs and getting them to market. However, in a
few instances it has protected drugs that are immensely profitable,
drugs that presumably would have been developed even without the
incentives of the Act. These few exceptional drugs have been the
source of considerable concern to many people. Congresspersons,
activists, patients, and commentators have all demanded reform of the
Act to prevent this situation from recurring in the future.67 To date,
these reform attempts have all been unsuccessful. This issue will be
discussed in much more detail in parts Im and IV, infra. However,
these few drugs are exceptional and the problem temporary. The
situation does not warrant the attention paid to it. Like most
legislation, the Act has had some unforeseen negative consequences.
Unlike most legislation, however, the Act has also been extremely
successful in what it attempts to accomplish - getting orphan drugs
to market. As such, it is dangerous to tinker with the Act and risk
destroying its effectiveness over a few cases of "misuse."
3. Open Protocols
The Orphan Drug Act also provides a means for more easily
getting the drugs to the patients who need them.68 Manufacturers are
64. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(1) (1994).
65. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(2) (1994).
66. See supra Part II.B.
67. See, e.g., Arno et al., supra note 5; Meyers, supra note 32; 137 CONG. REC. E2435-37
(daily ed. June 27, 1991) (article critical of the Orphan Drug Act inserted into the record by Rep.
Gerry Studds).
68. See 21 U.S.C. § 360dd (1994).
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encouraged to use open protocols for their clinical trials. 69 Open
protocols allow the manufacturer to make the orphan drug available to
patients who are not participating in the clinical trials while the trials
are still ongoing. This provision is not so much an incentive to the
manufacturers as it is a boon to patients. However, it gives the
manufacturers an opportunity to recoup some costs by selling drugs to
patients before receiving full approval, and it may also help the
companies generate more test data.70
4. Orphan Products Board
Another way the Orphan Drug Act helped drug manufacturers is
by establishing an Orphan Products Board in the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), the body with authority over
the FDA.71 The Board is charged with coordinating the various
government agencies that are involved in the development of orphan
drugs and keeping all interested parties informed. Many of the
expected functions of this Board, such as the administration of the
orphan drug grant program, have actually fallen to the FDA's Office
of Orphan Product Development.72
5. Tax Credits
The second big financial incentive provided by the Orphan Drug
Act is a tax credit for "qualified clinical testing expenses."73 The tax
credit is for fifty percent of the amounts spent conducting clinical
trials. The original Senate bill called for a ninety percent credit, while
the House bill called for no tax credit. 74 The two bodies chose fifty
percent as the compromise number. The tax credit is not refundable
and it could not be carried forward or backward. The tax is subject to
a periodic renewal; this provision expired on May 31, 1997. 75
6. Grants
The final incentive provided by the Orphan Drug Act is grants to
69. See Haffner, supra note 29, at 608-09.
70. See Henry, supra note 22, at 624 (discussing Treatment INDs).
71. See 42 U.S.C.§ 236 (1994).
72. See Welcome to the Office of Orphan Products Development (OOPD) (visited Apr.
12, 1999) <http://www.fda.gov//orphan/index.htm>.
73. 26 U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. II 1994).
74. See Donna Brown Grossman, The Orphan Drug Act: Adoption or Foster Care?, 39
FOOD DRUG & COSMBTIC L.J 128,138-41 (1984).
75. See 26 U.S.C. § 45C(e)(2) (Supp. II 1994).
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defray the costs of "qualified testing."76 This originally only included
clinical trials in humans, but the 1988 Amendments expanded the
definition to cover all testing after a drug is designated as an orphan
drug.77 The grants are subject to periodic renewal, and the amount
available has increased with time.
D. Regulation Provisions
A long time elapsed between the passage of the Orphan Drug
Act and the FDA's promulgation of Regulations for implementing it,
as required by the Act.78  Commentators frequently noted this
delinquency.79 In the FDA's defense, Congress amended the Act
three times during this delay, and threatened to amend it on several
other occasions. When the Regulations were finally enacted, they
resolved several troubling issues.80
1. Information Disclosure
The Regulations formalized the procedure for obtaining orphan
drug designation.81 The Regulations now specify the format for an
orphan drug designation request and the information required.82 They
also for the first time set forth the data required to demonstrate that a
drug is unlikely to be profitable even though the disease it treats
affects more than 200,000 people8 3 (although, since no drug company
has ever attempted to obtain designation under this provision, this
omission was not a large problem). The Regulations also define the
conditions for the approval, refusal, and revocation of orphan drug
designation.84 Importantly, the Regulations provide sanctions for the
76. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (1994).
77. See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-290, 102 Stat. 90. The 1988
amendments also expanded the grants program to cover orphan medical devices and medical
foods; however, devices and foods are not eligible for the other incentives of the Act,
particularly the market exclusivity. See id.
78. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(d) (1994).
79. See, e.g., Lawton, supra note 43, at 332; Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 277.
80. The FDA lacked the power to rectify all the problems of the Act, despite the demands
of some commentators. The FDA was, of course, limited by the text of the statute. See, e.g.,
Arno et al., supra note 5, at 246; Meyers, supra note 32.
81. Before the issuance of the Regulations, the FDA administered the Orphan Drug Act
under a set of interim guidelines. See Implementation of the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, 48 Fed.
Reg. 40784 (1983) (proposed Sept. 9, 1983) (notice of availability of interim procedures).
82. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.10 (1998).
83. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.21(c) (1998).
84. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.24,316.25,316.29 (1998).
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misstatements of fact in any application. 85 They also elaborate the
details for administering the market exclusivity provision 86 and the
open protocol provision.87 Finally, the Regulations clarify what
information the FDA holds confidential and what information it
releases to the public.88
2. Same Drug
One of the most troubling problems the FDA faced in
administering the Orphan Drug Act was deciding whether two drugs
were the "same" for the purposes of market exclusivity. Before the
issuance of the Regulations, the FDA decided this question on a case-
by-case basis.89 Occasionally, the courts had to resolve difficulties. 90
Proteins and other biologicals presented particular difficulties in this
context.91
The FDA resolved this issue with a series of fairly straight-
forward definitions and rules. For "small molecule" pharmaceuticals,
two drugs are the "same" if they share the same "active moiety,"
which is defined to be the core molecule of the drug, excluding
noncovalent attachments. 92 However, even if two drugs are the same
under these criteria, "if the subsequent drug can be shown to be
clinically superior to the first drug, it will not be considered to be the
same drug."93 "Clinically superior" is defined to mean: (1) having
greater effectiveness (which generally must be demonstrated by a
direct comparative clinical trial);94 (2) having greater safety in a
significant portion of the target population; 95 or (3) "otherwise
mak[ing] a major contribution to patient care."'96
For "large molecules (macromolecules)," the rules are more
85. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.29(a) (1998).
86. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.31, 316.34,316.36 (1998).
87. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.40 (1998).
88. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.50, 316.52 (1998).
89. See Lawton, supra note 43, at 332.
90. See Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301 (D.D.C. 1987) (discussed infra Part
IV.D).
91. This same problem also troubles patent attorneys and patent examiners.
92. 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.3(b)(13)(i), 316.3(b)(2) (1998).
93. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13)(i) (1998).
94. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3)(i) (1998).
95. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3)(ii) (1998).
96. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3)(iii) (1998). The notes accompanying the final Regulations
indicate that this includes such things as allowing oral dosing of a drug formerly available only
for injection. See 57 FED. REG. 62076 (1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3161 (issued Dec.
29, 1992).
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complex, and the Regulations use separate definitions for proteins,
polysaccharides, polynucleotides, and "complex partly definable
drugs... such as... live viral vaccines."97  Two proteins are the
same if they have only minor differences in amino acid sequence. If
they differ in ways that may be more important, such as in
glycosylation patterns or tertiary structures, they are presumed to be
the same unless the second protein demonstrates clinical superiority.98
Two polysaccharides are presumed to be the same if they consist of
identical repeating units, even if they vary in number or are modified.
Again, this presumption can be overcome with a showing of clinical
superiority.99 Polynucleotides are the same if they have the same
sequence and the same sugar backbone (ribose or deoxyribose),
subject to a demonstration of clinical superiority.OO Finally, closely
related complex partly definable drugs are considered identical unless
the applicant proves the later drug to be clinically superior. 101
These definitions should resolve most of the difficulties
associated with deciding whether or not two drugs are the same.
3. Disease Subsets
The other big problem addressed by the Regulations is the
"salami slicing" problem. "Salami slicing" refers to the practice of
artificially dividing one disease into arbitrary subsets, so that these
subsets contain fewer than 200,000 afflicted individuals and the drugs
for treating them are eligible for orphan drug designation. 102 If a
company is successful with this approach, it may acquire multiple
approvals for the same drug for treating what are essentially facets of
the same disease and obtain market exclusivity for a drug that is not
really an orphan. This process abuses the principles of the Act.103
97. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13)(ii) (1998).
98. See 21 C.F.Rt § 316.3(b)(13)(ii)(A) (1998). The wording of the rule seems to suggest
that sponsors of protein drugs with minor changes in amino acid sequence will not be given a
chance to demonstrate clinical superiority, which may not be the best result.
99. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13)(ii)(B) (1998).
100. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13)(ii)(C) (1998).
101. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13)(ii)(D) (1998).
102. See 57 Fed. Reg. 62076, 62077 (1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316) (issued
Dec. 29, 1992) (response to comment 12); see also Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at
288; Patricia J. Kenney, The Orphan Drug Act-Is It a Barrier to Innovation? Does It Create
Unintended Windfalls?, 43 FOOD DRUG & COSMETC L.J. 667, 678 (1988). One of the more
striking attempts in this direction was an attempt "to get orphan drug status for a drug to relieve
knee pain. Left-knee pain." John Carey & Joan O'C. Hamilton, These 'Orphans' Don't Need
Any Nurturing, Bus. WEEK July 2, 1990, at 38.
103. See 57 Fed. Reg. 62076, 62077 (1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316) (issued
Dec. 29, 1992) (response to comment 12); see also Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at
19991
316 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol.15
The FDA has attempted to prevent this situation on a case-by-
case basis wherever possible, although some critics state that the FDA
has not been entirely successful. 104 The Regulations codify and
clarify the approach the FDA uses in making its determination. If a
company attempts to obtain designation for treating a subset of people
with a particular disease, the company must present "a demonstration
that the subset is medically plausible."' 05 This definition has been
attacked as vague and ineffective. However, as the FDA pointed out
in the preamble to the proposed Regulations 106 and in the response to
comments on the proposed Regulations (included with the final
Regulations), 107 formulating a more precise rule would be almost
impossible. The relevant inquiry is highly fact and situation-specific
and hence not well suited to a fixed rule. 108
I1. PROPOSED AMENDMENTs
In the years since 1983, Congress (and commentators) has
perceived several problems with the Orphan Drug Act. The biggest
problem by far, and one that manifests itself in several different ways,
is the problem of "profitable orphans." The tax provisions have also
been a source of frequent concern. To handle these perceived
problems, Congress has proposed myriad Amendments to the Act.
A. Profitable Orphan Drugs
1. The Problem
Since the passage of the Orphan Drug Act, a few companies
have taken advantage of its market exclusivity provisions to earn
enormous profits on a few drugs. A wealth of commentary addresses
this subject. However, when examined closely, the commentary all
focuses on essentially the same four or five drugs: AZT (HIV
288; Kenney, supra note 102; see Carey & Hamilton, supra note 102.
104. See 57 Fed. Reg. 62076, 62077 (1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316) (issued
Dec. 29, 1992) (response to comment 12); see also Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 288;
Kenney, supra note 102; see Carey & Hamilton, supra note 102; Arno et al., supra note 5, at
236-38 (including Table showing AIDS drugs used to "treat" and "prevent" the same condition).
105. 21 C.F.R. § 316.20(b)(6) (1998).
106. See 56 Fed. Reg. 3338, 3339-3340 (1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316)
(proposed Jan. 29, 1991).
107. See 57 Fed. Reg. 62076, 62077, 62081 (1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316)
(responses to comments 12 & 49).
108. The FDA also declined here, as elsewhere, to provide hypothetical examples, on the
grounds that they were more likely to be misleading than helpful. See id.
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infection/AIDS); pentamidine isethionate (pneumonia associated with
AIDS); human growth hormone (hGH) (improper growth in children
lacking the enzyme); erythropoietin (EPO) (anemia associated with
end-stage renal disease); and CeredaseTm (Gaucher's disease). 109 The
first two are chemical entities; the latter three are proteins. All of
these drugs have been undoubtedly profitable, often recovering their
development costs in the first year or two of sales. They also nicely
illustrate the different aspects of the profitable orphan issue.110
a. Protected Profitability
Some orphan drugs have been profitable simply because they are
protected from competition by the market exclusivity provision;
Ceredase is a good example of this. Gaucher's disease is a classic
orphan, and Genzyme, the holder of the exclusivity on Ceredase, did
not have to manipulate the rules to get designation. 111 Furthermore,
Genzyme almost certainly would not have developed Ceredase
without the promise of market protection. 12 However, the protection
from competition allows Genzyme to charge a monopoly price, and
hence it makes huge profits on the drug.113
Ceredase draws so much attention because it is particularly
difficult to manufacture, and thus its production costs are very
high.114 When the monopoly rents are added on to this, the price
appears particularly exorbitant. Estimates range as high as $350,000
in the first year, and while the dosage can be reduced after the first
109. See, e.g., Arno et al., supra note 5; Dana P. Goldman et al., Creating the Costliest
Orphan: The Orphan Drug Act in the Development of Ceredase TM , 8 INTL J. TECH.
AssEssMENT HEALTH CARE 583 (1992); Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 279-289;
Lawton, supra note 43, at 331-343; Carey & Hamilton, supra note 102.
110. In the midst of all this "greed," it should be pointed out that Bristol-Myers Squibb
voluntarily relinquished its orphan drug designations for the AIDS drug Videx and the cancer
agent Taxol, stating that it had 'learned more about the potential uses for the two drugs', and felt
that retaining orphan status for them 'was not in keeping with the purpose of the act." Orphan
Drug Act at 10 Years: Rep. Waxman Prepared to Move Again on Amendments, 55 F.D.C. RP.
("The Pink Sheet") (Mar. 1, 1993) (available on Westiaw in the FDC-RPTS database).
111. See Goldman et al., supra note 109, at 585 (Gaucher's disease probably afflicts at most
20,000 people in the U.S., Genzyme asserts only 3000 of whom warrant treatment.).
112. See Henri A. Termeer, The Cost of Miracles, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1993, at A28 (Mr.
Termeer is CEO of Genzyme); Goldman et al., supra note 109, at 588 ("[O]rphan designation
was the impetus behind Genzyme's quest for FDA approval.")
113. Genzyme apparently recovered its development costs fairly quickly. See Apology to
Genzyme, Inc., for Overstating Current Profits from Orphan Drugs, 139 CONG. REC. H1883-84
(daily ed. April 5, 1993) (noting initial investment of $29 million recovered many times over).
114. See Goldman et al., supra note 109, at 589; see also Apology to Genzyme, Inc., 139
CONG. REc. H1883 (daily ed. April 5, 1993) (manufacturing costs of $1.90/unit).
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year, the treatments must be continued for the life of the patient. 115
Many patients are unable to afford this cost, and even those with
insurance frequently exhaust that resource fairly quickly at this
price.116 This situation has led to an outcry against Genzyme and the
market exclusivity provision of the Orphan Drug Act. 117
However, this outcry may be unwarranted. In the case of
Ceredase, the Act seems to have worked exactly as it was intended to
work: it gave Genzyme motivation to develop the drug, and
Genzyme developed Ceredase. 118 The difficulty of meeting the price
is not a problem with the Orphan Drug Act, but with the general
healthcare delivery system in the U.S.119 No patient is in a worse
position because of the market protection. Those who cannot afford
the drug are in the same position they would occupy if the drug had
never been developed. Furthermore, at least some patients, those who
can afford Ceredase, are in a better position. Many of the proposed
changes to the Act would significantly change the incentive structure,
with unpredictable results. Under an amended Act, Ceredase might
well have never been developed and both patients and drug
manufacturers would suffer.120
This last point is important, as it is relevant to all of the problems
discussed in this section, but it is often neglected by commentators.
Many commentators treat the problem as a choice between having
expensive drugs because of protection or having less expensive drugs
by not protecting them. But the real tradeoff (unless one rejects the
whole premise of the Orphan Drug Act and the need for its incentives,
which few do explicitly)121 is between having expensive drugs and
having no drugs for these diseases. As Robert K. Dresing, head of the
115. See Goldman et al., supra note 109, at 591.
116. See Larry Thompson, The High Cost of Rare Diseases-When Patients Can't Afford to
Buy Lifesaving Drugs, WASH. POST, June 25, 1991, (Health), at 10.
117. Reps. Stark and Studds have repeatedly attacked Genzyme in the Congressional
Record. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. H1883 (daily ed. April 5, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. H1851
(daily ed. April 1, 1993); 137 CoNG. REC. E2435 -37(daily ed. June 27, 1991).
118. See Termeer, supra note 112, at A28.
119. See Charles A. Sanders, The Orphan Drug Act: Should It Be Changed?, 153
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2623, 2625 (1993) (one of the few commentators to answer the title
question "No") (Dr. Sanders is affiliated with Glaxo Corp.).
120. The Orphan Drug Act thus leads to a Pareto-superior outcome. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 13 (4th ed. 1992).
121. But cf. Flynn, supra note 10, at 395-96 (suggesting in an underhanded way that we
might have gotten all those orphan drugs even without the Act, since we cannot tell now which
were a result of the Act and which would have been developed anyway); id. at 443 (calling the
market exclusivity provision "a form of discredited 1980s trickle down economic theory"); Arno
et al., supra note 5, at 241 (questioning the need for marketing exclusivity as an incentive).
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Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, said, "[P]aying even $300,000 a year for
an effective drug against cystic fibrosis would be preferable to having
no drug at all!" 122 Another important point that is often overlooked is
that market exclusivity is merely temporary. The term of exclusivity
is only seven years. Thus,in a fairly short time (although, of course,
it seems too long to those who cannot afford the drugs), the market is
open to as much competition as it can sustain. In fact, all of the drugs
listed above that have ignited the controversy are now past their
exclusivity period. 123
Henri Termeer, CEO of Genzyme, points out an interesting
aspect of the Ceredase situation. The Act allowed Genzyme to make
the first steps into this area, and Genzyme's success led to competition
to develop other, less costly treatments.1 24 Thus, the protected market
for Ceredase had the effect of increasing competition in this
market.125
Another reason to accept the profitability of drugs like Ceredase
is the general nature of the pharmaceutical industry. Because drug
research is highly unpredictable, 126 successful drugs must subsidize
the failures. 127 In the case of at least one company, Genentech, one
blockbuster orphan drug (hGH) is viewed as subsidizing another drug,
Actimmune (chronic granulomatous disease), that is not a
122. Gina M. Cavalier, Pushing Parentless Pharmaceuticals: Toward an International
Home for "Orphan Drugs" and a Cure for "Zebra" Diseases, 27 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 447,
457 n.70 (1996) (quoting testimony before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly, and
Business Rights, quoted in Rex Rhein & Tony Delamothe, Orphan Drugs, 304 BRIT. MED. J.
465 (1992)). But see id. at 457 ("[]t does not make sense to waste precious resources to
develop a cure when sufferers cannot benefit from it because of prohibitive cost.").
123. See Arno et al., supra note 5, at 239 (pentamidine, 1996); Goldman et al., supra note
109, at 588 (Ceredase, 1998); Carey & Hamilton, supra note 102, at 38 (EPO, 1996; AZT, 1994;
hGH, 1994); see also Paul V. Buday, Hints on Preparing Successful Orphan Drug Designation
Requests, 51 FOoD & DRUG L. 75, 76 n.10 (1996) (noting that exclusivity has expired on 26
orphan drugs (as of Feb. 1996)).
124. See Termeer, supra note 112, at A28.
125. One potential flaw in this theory is that Gaucher's disease is still an orphan, and so the
new treatments may also be protected. However, as with attempts to "design around" patents,
these treatments may well be sufficiently different to warrant separate designation and so
compete with each other. Alternatively, some of them will be so similar to Ceredase that they
could compete when the exclusivity expired in 1998. See Goldman et al., supra note 109, at 588
(table showing FDA approval in 1991).
126. See Henry, supra note 22, at 617 ("For every 10,000 drug candidates created in the lab
only 1,000 compounds will be tested in animals to reveal their pharmacological and
toxicological characteristics. Of those 1,000 compounds, only one will end up on the
pharmacist's shelf. Only one in five new compounds tested in humans is likely to reach the
market.").
127. See Sanders, supra note 119, at 2624 (1993).
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blockbuster. 128 Furthermore, the lure of developing a blockbuster is
part of what keeps the game going. "If drug companies are told there
will be no winners, these companies are unlikely to enter a game in
which they cannot offset their losses." 129 Thus, large profits for a few
drugs might be something to embrace, rather than avoid. This is
especially true since so few (less than ten percent) of orphan drugs
even approach blockbuster status. 130 Large profits for a very few
drugs may be the price patients must pay (and should pay gladly) to
have an orphan drug system that works as well as it does.
b. Losing the Race
Another problem cited by critics is the situation of firms racing
each other for orphan drug approval. Some of these drugs were so
likely to be successful that more than one company obtained orphan
drug designation, in pursuit of the market exclusivity that would be
granted to the first to complete clinical trials and get the drug
approved for sale. 131 This is viewed as a problem for two primary
reasons. First, it calls into question the "orphan" status of the drugs;
true orphans rarely have prospective parents fighting over them.132
The fact that firms are fighting over these drugs suggests that in fact
they are likely to be profitable, and hence it is an abuse of the orphan
drug incentives if they are applied to these drugs. 133
However, this argument rests on a faulty premise. It assumes
that these companies would be racing anyway, and the incentives are
therefore an unnecessary prize. An entirely plausible explanation is
that the race is a race for the incentives of the Act. In fact, this is
essentially the premise on which the exclusivity provisions rest: the
provisions convert what would be a losing proposition (if copycats
could take advantage of the work of the orphan drug pioneer) into a
128. See id. (quoting G. Kirk Raab, then-president and CEO of Genentech).
129. See id. (quoting G. Kirk Raab, then-president and CEO of Genentech).
130. See Shulman et al., supra note 38, at 402 (Table 11, indicating that only the top decile
of drugs are taking in truly blockbuster revenues). In the time since this article, many more
orphan drugs have been approved but there have been no reports of more blockbusters.
131. See Lawton, supra note 43, at 331 (discussing, inter alia, the approvals of hGH, EPO,
and pentamidine).
132. Cf. James T. O'Reilly, Orphan Drugs: The Strange Case of "Baby M", 42 FOOD DRUG
& COSMErlC L.J. 516, 516 (1987) (analogizing these popular orphan drugs to Baby M, whose
biological parents and adoptive parents fought over her custody).
133. See Meyers, supra note 32, at 11 (stating a drug should not be designated as an orphan
unless the incentives of the Act are "absolutely essential to ensure its development," and
indicating that multiple companies were unlikely to be interested in a drug that was truly of
"limited" commercial value).
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winning one (by granting the pioneer an exclusive market). The
market exclusivity makes the market potentially profitable, and thus
makes the drug worth racing for.134 Races for approval may thus be
interpreted as a sign that the Act is serving its purpose by giving drug
companies incentives to develop otherwise unprofitable drugs. In
most cases, distinguishing a race for orphan drug incentives from a
race for a drug that would have been developed anyway is almost
impossible, again pointing out the dangers of changing the Act. The
effects on the races of any changes to the Act cannot be foreseen in
advance. An amendment that changes the incentives could have
adverse consequences for a highly successful piece of legislation.
The second difficulty with racing is that it wastes resources and
that it can be very hard on the loser, who has invested a great deal of
time and money but has not achieved any reward. These parameters
and resolutions of this very complex issue are not clear. Further
exploration of this issue is in the shared exclusivity discussion,
contained in Part mH.A.2.a, infra.
c. Salami Slicing
The next criticized abuse of the Act is the phenomenon of
"salami slicing."'135  As mentioned above, salami slicing - the
practice of dividing a medical condition into subsets containing fewer
than 200,000 individuals and then obtaining exclusivity for each
market - is a real problem under the Act. However, the extent of the
problem and incidence of success of this strategy are not entirely
clear. Critics present the case of EPO as the clearest demonstration of
this problem.136 Amgen obtained market exclusivity for using EPO to
treat anemia associated with end-stage renal disease. However, EPO
is also useful for treating a wide range of other anemias, and has even
been designated for some of these other conditions. 137 It is also
useful for treating patients with renal disease before it reaches end-
134. A large patent race literature supports this point. See generally Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COL-M. L. REV. 839
(1990), and references therein.
135. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
136. See John M. Coster, Recombinant Erythropoietin: Orphan Product with a Silver
Spoon, 8 INTL J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 635, 636-37 (1992). Patients with end-
stage renal disease have chronic kidney failure, and so their kidneys fail to produce endogenous
EPO, which makes them anemic; giving them exogenous EPO helps alleviate this condition. See
id. at 635.
137. See Arno et al., supra note 5, at 242; Shulman et al., supra note 38, at 371; Rin-
Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 281,288.
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stage. 138 Thus, Amgen appears to have sliced up the market for EPO
into artificial submarkets and thereby obtained exclusivity
inappropriately.139
The right result in this case is not entirely clear. Ideally, since
EPO would probably have been developed without the help of the
Act, it should not be eligible for protection.140 However, in some
cases, dividing a market makes sense. For example, if a drug has
particularly toxic side effects, it might only be appropriate for patients
who have failed to respond to other, less toxic treatments (this
particular argument would not apply to EPO). 14 1 Devising a rule that
would eliminate salami slicing and not discourage appropriate
submarketing would be nearly impossible, as the two situations are
difficult to distinguish, even with a detailed analysis.
The FDA has attempted to resolve this problem in the
Regulations by stating that disease subsets must be "medically
plausible."'142 The effect of this rule on the EPO designation is not
clear. The end-stage renal disease patients may be a medically
plausible subset, or they may instead be the result of salami slicing.
The same holds true for the other forms of anemia. To a large degree,
this is a medical decision, with a dollop of policy thrown in. In the
case of EPO, the obvious profitability of the drug should probably
have been weighed against the grant of designation. However, the
call is a close one and it is hard to find fault with the FDA's choice,
considering the limited evidence available at that time and the FDA's
limited experience with the Act.143 With 16 years of experience in
administering the Act, the FDA is now in a much better position to
employ its "medically plausible" subset definition. Hopefully it can
avoid the problems associated with approving a highly profitable drug
like EPO.
138. See id.
139. See Coster, supra note 136, at 636. One of the main reasons that Congress is so
concerned about the high price of EPO is that it is covered by Medicare and Medicaid, and thus
the high price of EPO caused by its market monopoly impacts directly on the federal budget.
See id.
140. See Coster, supra note 136, at 642.
141. See 56 Fed. Reg. 3338, 3339 (1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 316) (proposed
Jan. 29, 1991) (preamble to the FDA's proposed Orphan Drug Regulations).
142. See supra Part ll.D.3.
143. The FDA has apparently tweaked the rules a little bit to help alleviate this problem
and allow some competition in the EPO market. See Coster, supra note 136, at 641.
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d. Expanding Orphan Diseases
The final problem cited by critics of the Orphan Drug Act is
expanding orphan diseases. This term is used in discussing drugs that
met the orphan condition of treating an indication that affected fewer
than 200,000 people at the' time they were approved,144 but the
indication later expands to affect more than 200,000 people before the
period of marketing exclusivity ends. The paradigmatic example of
this type of disease is AIDS, which is an infectious disease that has
spread throughout the population. Many drugs that received orphan
'designation for conditions related to AIDS have become very
lucrative as the market has expanded to encompass more and more
people. AZT and pentamidine are two drugs that fit into this
category. 145
Again, like salami slicing, the expansion of AIDS is a real
problem. However, it arises in an unusual situation, one that
(fortunately) is unlikely to be duplicated. Most orphan drugs treat
conditions such as genetic diseases or cancers, which do not
spread. 146 Furthermore, AIDS passed the 200,000 affected persons
threshold in 1993, and so most AIDS-related conditions no longer
qualify for orphan drug designation.147 Barring another outbreak
such as AIDS, this problem is unlikely to recur.148,149
Some of the profitable drugs in this small group clearly fall
outside the intent of the original Orphan Drug Act, which was
designed to give incentives to drug companies so they would develop
144. This is all the Act requires. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1994) (stating that eligibility
is determined "on the basis of the facts and circumstances as of the date the request for
designation of the drug.. . is made").
145. See Arno et al., supra note 5, at 238 (Table 1 presenting these and other AIDS-related
orphan drugs).
146. See Shulman et al., supra note 38, at 370, 387 (Table I showing distribution of orphan
drugs by disease class; only 19% in AIDS and other infectious diseases).
147. See Arno et al., supra note 5, at 240.
148. Another possible type of disease expansion is an improved diagnostic technique that
suddenly increases the known afflicted population for an indication. This seems somewhat
improbable; the sudden discovery of such a population requiring a drug treatment that is already
available to the known patients with that indication, and protected, is unlikely. In any case, as
discussed in Part m.A.1.a, supra, the problem would be temporary, ending at the latest in 7
years.
149. See Amo et al., supra note 5, use AIDS as a lens for viewing the Orphan Drug Act,
and on so viewing concluded that it is cracked. However, it is the lens that is cracked, not the
Act. AIDS is totally atypical of orphan diseases, and as such reveals very little about how the
Orphan Drug Act works in general. But see Robert A. Hamilton, Rare Disease Treatments:
'Orphans' Saving Lives, FDA CONSUMER, November 1990, at 6, 8 (suggesting that the Orphan
Drug Act did facilitate the development of AIDS drugs in the early years).
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drugs that were otherwise unlikely to be developed (although as
discussed supra they all arguably fit within the text of the Act).
However, these drugs are the exception rather than the rule. This is
most evident in the exceedingly thorough analysis of what has
actually happened under the Act performed by Shulman et al.150
Shulman et al looked at all of the data they could collect on the
orphan drug designations and approvals that were granted during the
first eight years of the Orphan Drug Act and analyzed that data in
several different ways. Their results demonstrate overwhelmingly
that the Act is achieving its intended purpose: getting drugs to people
with rare diseases. 151
2. The Proposed Solutions
Despite arguments to the contrary, the overwhelming majority of
commentators and Congresspersons think that the Orphan Drug Act
needs to be fixed. Consequently, a number of Amendments to the Act
have been proposed over the years. However, none of these proposals
have been implemented (except the changes discussed in Part II.B,
supra). These proposed Amendments have attempted to change the
Act in a variety of ways.
a. Shared Exclusivity
The most popular and controversial provision for changing the
Orphan Drug Act is shared exclusivity. 152 Shared exclusivity
primarily addresses the racing problem. However, since it may serve
to increase competition, it also addresses the problem of high prices
and profits in general. Congress has proposed various Amendments
that would have allowed two or more drug companies simultaneously
developing an orphan drug to "share" the market exclusivity. In
general, these Amendments allow drug companies that file for
designation and approval within a certain length of time of each other
150. Shulman et al., supra note 38, at 363-403.
151. See, e.g., iaL at 395-99 (Table 8 showing incidence of indications treated by approved
orphan drugs; range is I to 184,000, skewed toward lower incidence). See also id. at 402 (Table
11 showing mean sales of orphan drugs by decile; large gap between top decile (4 drugs) and
rest of distribution; distribution highly skewed toward lower sales); id. at 380 (reporting median
sales for U.S. orphan drugs as $1.6 million); see also Haffner, supra note 29, at 604 (Figure 1
showing breakdown of orphan drug designations by disease prevalence (1983-1990); 50% of
drugs are for diseases affecting fewer than 25,000 people; 68% of drugs are for diseases
affecting fewer than 50,000 people; 84% of drugs are for diseases affecting fewer than 100,000
people); Sanders, supra note 119, at 2623 ("[Tihe Orphan Drug Act of 1983... has done
exactly what its supporters intended it to do.").
152. "Shared exclusivity" is an oxymoron, but it is the term used in the literature.
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to each be granted the seven years of market exclusivity.
As early as 1986, Congress proposed to change the Act so that it
would allow sharing of exclusivity when two drugs were developed
"simultaneously." "Simulaneously" was defined as the later company
submitting its application for approval before the earlier company's
application was approved.153  This bill failed to pass. The next
attempt to provide for shared exclusivity occurred in 1990.154 The
Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990 proposed a more rigorous
standard for simultaneous development. The later companies had to:
(1) file the requests for designation within six months of the
publication of the leader's designation; (2) start their clinical trials
within twelve months of the leader; and (3) file for approval and
request exclusivity within twelve months of the leader's filing for
approval. 155 These strict requirements were intended to prevent
copycat generic companies from appropriating the work of the leaders
and then forcing the leaders to share their exclusivity. The
requirements could help guarantee that the two companies were in
fact simultaneously developing the orphan drug. 156 After President
Bush pocket vetoed the 1990 Amendments, Congress reintroduced
the same simultaneity provisions in the Orphan Drug Act
Amendments of 1994, which were not enacted. 157
The shared exclusivity provisions would allow as many
companies as developed the orphan drug within the given time
window to share the market exclusivity. Three basic concerns drive
153. See 132 CONG. REc. S11944 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Mr. Hatch in the
introduction of S. 2772).
154. See 136 CONG. REC. 20375,20375 (1990) (H.R. 4638); H.R. REP. No. 101-635, at 2-3
(1990). The amendment planned to make the shared exclusivity retroactive, thereby breaking up
the monopolies of the blockbuster drugs; however, there was some dispute over whether this
would be an "unconstitutional taking." See Orphan Drug Bill Amendments Would Result in
"Unconstitutional Taking," 52 F.D.C. REP. ("The Pink Sheet") (June 11, 1990) (available in
Westlaw, FDC-RPTS database); David B. Clissold, Prescription for the Orphan Drug Act: The
Impact of the FDA's 1992 Regulations and the Latest Congressional Proposals for Reform, 50
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 144 (1995).
155. See e.g., 132 CONG. REc. S11944 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Mr. Hatch in
the introduction of S. 2772). These standards would put a drug developer into an interesting
quandary over when to file for designation. Current practice is usually to wait until the last
minute, just before filing for approval. See Buday, supra note 123, at 79. This approach has the
advantage of giving other companies as little notice as possible of the filing. However, under
shared exclusivity, early filing would have the advantage of potentially discouraging other
companies from competing, since the early filing exerts pressure to meet the deadlines. Which
of these strategies would win out is not obvious to me.
156. See 136 CONG. REC. 20375,20377 (1990) (comments of Rep. Nielson).
157. See 140 CONG. REc. S3685-01, S3728 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum).
1999]
326 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol.15
these sharing provisions: (1) allow competition so the price is
reduced; (2) avoid the wasting of resources that occurs when two
companies race for a prize that only one can obtain; and (3) prevent
force the "losing" company that has made a huge investment of time
and money (perhaps without even knowing it was in a race) from
gaoing away with nothing. 158
The premise that shared exclusivity automatically leads to price
competition and therefore to significantly lower prices is somewhat
questionable in the drug market. Historically, the rise of the
pharmaceutical industry was founded on intellectual property
protection (primarily product patents), which enabled competition
based on innovation rather than price. 159 The principle of shared
protection and price competition is thus largely foreign to the drug
market, and allowing shared exclusivity is therefore unlikely to have
the desired effect on drug companies. Furthermore, even if shared
exclusivity generates actual competition, it may not significantly
reduce prices. The experience with hGH, which is essentially a
shared exclusivity between Genentech and Eli Lilly, 160 demonstrates
this point: despite the competition, hGH is still one of the highest
priced and most profitable orphans, for both companies. 161
Moreover, even before the Act, orphan products were already more
costly than average drugs, regardless of development cost, 162 and thus
competition may not reduce prices significantly.
For the other two concerns, shared versus absolute exclusivity
raises many difficult issues. Orphan drug exclusivity racing is in
many ways analogous to patent racing, and so the patent race
literature is instructive on these issues. 163
158. See Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 286-87; Kenney, supra note 102, at 675-
76.
159. See Carolyn H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug Act: The First 7 Years, 265 JAMA 893,
896 (1991); Sanders, supra note 119, at 2624 (both making this point and citing Temin, supra
note 25, for the observation that drug companies compete on innovation rather than price).
160. The two products differ by a single amino acid, but because they have different
sources, the FDA at the time (before the Regulations went into effect) decided that they were
different products; however, for all practical purposes, the drugs are identical. But see
Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 311-13 (D.D.C. 1987) (discussed infra Part IV.D).
The two products would almost certainly be deemed the same under the Regulations. See supra
Part ll.D.2.
161. See Arno et al., supra note 5, at 246 (discussing hGH and suggesting that "shared
exclusivity may be insufficient to lower orphan drug prices[, which] is certainly counterintuitive
and implies imperfections in the pharmaceutical marketplace").
162. See Asbury, supra note 159, at 896.
163. See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 134, and references therein. Interestingly,
comparisons between patents and orphan drug exclusivity may provide insight back into patent
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One issue is the effect of shared exclusivity on efficient
cooperation. Shared exclusivity could lead to either more cooperation
or to less. In a winner-take-all race, each side has the incentive to
cooperate so that it does not risk losing completely. On the other
hand, depending on its risk tolerance and perceived standing in the
race, a company may be willing to risk being shut out for the chance
to take everything. Conversely, with shared exclusivity, the pressure
to cooperate is reduced, because the cost of losing is minimal; the
company will share in the prize if it finishes close. However, the
pressure to compete is similarly reduced, since the prize is much less
valuable because it is not absolute. Therefore, cooperating from the
start might make more sense since the prize will probably be shared
anyway.
Another factor that enters into this analysis is cost. Cooperative
research is likely to cost less than individual research, since
competitors almost always must duplicate at least part of each other's
work. Under these conditions, shared exclusivity will almost
certainly lead to cooperation, because a company will obtain
essentially the same prize either way and the costs will be less with
cooperation. The question then shifts to whether cooperation is the
most efficient way to get results. In the specific case of competing for
orphan drug approval of the same drug for the same condition,
competing firms are likely almost always to be duplicating each
other's work, rather than pursuing alternative strategies. Once
researchers know that the drug has some efficacy for the orphan
disease, all those companies in the race will be performing essentially
the same trials to get approval for use in humans. 164 Thus, races
would seem to be inefficient duplications of effort, and cooperative
efforts are favored. 165
A related way to encourage cooperation is to award a bigger
prize if it must be shared; in the context of the Orphan Drug Act, this
races. If Congress ever enacts shared exclusivity, a study of the resulting effects on the market
will provide particularly valuable information.
164. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Patents as an Incentive System, PROC. INT'L ECON ASSOC.,
Sept. 1992, at 281,285 (discussing inefficient duplication of costs).
165. See Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing: In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 691, 701-02 (1993) (discussing disadvantages of the "winner-take-all mentality in drug
research"); cf. id. at 708-09 (noting that the principles of patent policy are not inviolate "natural
economic laws" and should be examined critically). See also Manfredi La Manna et al., The
Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUR. ECON. REv. 1427, 1436 (1989). (The authors argued that
a patent system with multiple prizes might be preferable to a strict (i.e., single-winner) regime,
although they concluded that when inventions are "difficult" (which would seem to apply to
drug research, see supra note 126), the strict regime may be socially preferable.)
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could be accomplished by increasing the length of the shared
exclusivity term. This idea is sometimes presented as a quid pro quo
for denying the absolute exclusivity, or as a way to give all the
sharing companies a chance to recover their investments (since they
must sell at a lower price because of the competition), 166 but it will
also function as a cooperation incentive.
The remaining cooperation issue is whether or not getting a
shared (and hence smaller) prize, obtained at a potentially lower cost,
is a worthwhile trade-off. Drug companies may perceive that it is no
longer worth competing for shared exclusivity.167 One particular
worry is the interference of the antitrust laws, which might prevent
cooperation in some situations. 168 Having a shared prize while being
forbidden to cooperate would be the worst possible outcome, as the
costs would be the same as with winner-take-all competition, while
the rewards would be less.
Facilitating cooperation, however, is not the only or even
primary consideration for analyzing shared exclusivity. Shared
exclusivity in many respects appears to a potential drug producer as
practically indistinguishable from straight competition. The producer
would be unable to analyze in advance the possibilities of entry by
competitors into the market, which would be equivalent to
competition. Given the fact that drugs in general, and orphan drugs in
particular, are already risky investments, the uncertainty could easily
lead to investment at less than the optimal level. In many cases, the
market for an orphan drug is likely to be marginal at best, with only a
monopolist being able to make a profit. In a marginal market, firms
that enter because exclusivity makes the investment worthwhile will
be unwilling to do so if they risk gaining only an unprofitable partial
market. Even if a shared market were potentially profitable, the
increased uncertainty and difficulty of the forecasting calculations
might still make firms unwilling to take the risk of investing. This
uncertainty of risks in a shared market is exactly the problem that
faced drug companies before the Orphan Drug Act, and was in fact
the reason the Act was passed in the first place.
The most important drawback to shared exclusivity is the
incentive it would give drug companies to manipulate the designation
166. See Clissold, supra note 154, at 145; Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 286-87.
167. The history of the drug industry suggests that they may be reluctant to compete
without an exclusive reward. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
168. See Clissold, supra note 154, at 145; see generally Thomas M. Jorde & David J.
Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH. LJ. 1 (1989).
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process, and the corresponding enormous administration costs it
would impose on the FDA in trying to prevent such manipulation. As
the orphan drug system currently operates, drug companies may file
for designation with relatively little initial cost and little ongoing
burden. The FDA is not required to do extensive investigation and
monitoring of the designees, because designation does not convey
particularly large benefits. Designation does entitle the designee to
tax benefits, protocol assistance, and grants; however, as discussed
supra, experience has demonstrated that the primary benefit under the
Act is the market exclusivity, which the manufacturer can only obtain
after the drug goes through the normal drug approval process.
Under the proposed shared-exclusivity regime, designation
assumes an entirely new importance. The mere grant of designation
starts a six-month clock running for all other potential designees. If a
company does not file within this time, it is essentially barred from
pursuing the designated drug for that indication. Once the six-month
window is closed, any later company faces a losing position: if it
loses the race to develop the drug, it will be excluded from the
market; if it wins the race, the original designee still has a year to
catch up and share the exclusive market.169 The original designee is
thus under very little pressure to proceed quickly, since it knows that
another company is unlikely to start a development program under
these conditions.
Under the existing rules, the designation benefits of grants, tax
credits, and protocol assistance are only valuable for a company
actively pursuing the orphan drug. A shared-exclusivity system,
however would greatly increase the value of designation, since the
potential for excluding others or at least sharing in their market has
value in itself, regardless of the activity level of the company's drug-
development program. Thus, even if the company has no current
plans to develop an orphan drug, it will still have the incentive to get
designation, to protect the potential future market and perhaps prevent
competitors from even starting research and development.
As the system for designation currently stands, companies have
little disincentive to engage in this type of behavior. The Act does
require that a company inform the FDA of "any decision to
169. The one-year bar that starts running once the FDA grants exclusivity does prevent the
worst form of manipulation, which would be to file for designation and then let another
company develop the drug, only joining in the exclusivity if the drug proves profitable;
completing clinical trials in less than one year is impossible. The date bars as a whole similarly
exclude generic competition.
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discontinue active pursuit of approval" of a designated orphan
drug,170 and the FDA Regulations require annual repotts from holders
of designations. 171 However, these requirements suffer from serious
drawbacks. For one, "active pursuit" is not defined as any particular
level of research activity, and any comjlany wanting to avoid the
notification requirement could easily maintain some minimal level of
research that would arguably qualify. More importantly, neither of
these rules contains any provisions for enforcement. The most
effective sanction would be the revocation of designation. The Act is
silent on this point, but the Regulations are very specific on the
reasons for which a designation may be revoked - and these reasons
do not include failure of active pursuit or annual reporting.172
Congress could also provide the FDA with other ways to punish
companies for obtaining designation and then falling to pursue
approval.
Without a procedure for the revocation of designation or other
punishment, drug companies have no incentive to refrain from
obtaining designation as a weapon against competitors. However, the
Amendments proposed by Congress do not contain these provisions
for punishment. Furthermore, any proposed punishment scheme
would place a large enforcement burden on the FDA. Companies
with designations are very keen to preserve them, and any attempt to
revoke a designation would almost certainly require a hearing to
comport with due process. 173 The FDA would need to draft a set of
standards for what constituted "active pursuit" and then enforce it
rigorously. Most revocations would probably then have to be
defended in court. The administrative costs of maintaining a viable
system of shared exclusivity while preventing game playing would be
huge, and these costs are likely to far outweigh any gains from price
reduction due to competition. Any system of complex rules would
also itself be a disincentive to a company considering orphan drug
development, potentially leading the company to decide that the
hassle is just not worth the potential reward.
170. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(b)(2) (1994).
171. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.30 (1998).
172. See id. § 316.29 (revocation only for untrue or omitted information in the request for
designation).
173. Cf. 136 CONG. REC. 20375, 20375 (1990) (H.R. 4638). The amendment planned to
make the shared exclusivity retroactive, to break up the monopolies of the blockbuster drugs;
however, there was some dispute over whether this would be an "unconstitutional taking," and
the retroactivity provisions were deleted in committee. See Orphan Drug Bill Amendments
Would Result in "Unconstitutional Taking," supra note 154; Clissold supra note 154, at 144.
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Furthermore, the Act and Regulations give competitors no
indication of the credibility of a designee's research program. In fact,
the Regulations are quite particular that only the fact of designation
(including the sponsor, drug name, and condition treated) is made
available to the public. Thus, competitors have no way of judging
whether or not the designee is in fact actively pursuing the drug or is
merely holding onto the designation as a weapon. Without the ability
to monitor the progress of the designee, the competitors cannot gauge
the intensity of the threat posed by this weapon and thus cannot
properly assess whether or not to pursue the orphan drug. This
unpredictability of the competitive position is likely to make drug
manufacturers very nervous about committing resources to orphan
drug development, effectively destroying the incentive scheme
established by the Act.
Thus, while a change in the Orphan Drug Act to allow shared
exclusivity might enhance cooperation and seem more "fair" to losers,
the severe damage to the Act's incentives and the enormously
increased administration costs weigh against enacting any such
change. Given the success of the Act as it currently exists, the
potential gains from shared exclusivity are not worth the risks that
tampering with the Act might bring.
A variation on the shared exclusivity theme appeared in the 1987
Amendments. These amendments proposed to make the exclusivity
apply only against generic drug applications. 174 These "me-too"
applications allow generic drug companies to take advantage of the
clinical data collected by the original manufacturer, using this data to
get approval of a bioequivalent drug.175 Under the proposed 1987
Amendments, any company that collected all of the data needed for
approval could get the approval and protection from generic
competition. Thus, in true race situations where two companies were
independently gathering data, both could get approval and protection
from generic competition - but not from each other. In some
respects, this would resemble the protection provided by the Drug
Price Control and Patent Term Restoration Act (DPCPTR Act), which
made these generic applications possible but also provided periods of
174. See 133 CONG. REc. E3724-25 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1987) (introduction of H.R. 3349
Orphan Drug Amendments of 1987). The remainder of the provisions of the 1987 Amendments
were enacted as part of the Orphan Drug Amendments of 1988. See also Meyers, supra note 32,
at 11-12 (arguing that protection from generic competition was actually what was intended in
the original Act).
175. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (1994) (Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
provisions).
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market exclusivity against generic competitors for new drug
approvals. 7 6 However, the objections to shared exclusivity discussed
in this part apply even more convincingly to a system that lacks even
a time-based bar to entry, and so Congress should not revive these
Amendments.
b. Changed Exclusivity Term
Another popular proposal is to change the length of the term of
exclusivity. Various numbers have been proposed. The Orphan Drug
Act Amendments of 1994 proposed reducing the term to four years,
but with the opportunity to extend it to seven years if the holder of
exclusivity could prove that it was a drug of "limited commercial
potential."177
The Orphan Drug Amendments of 1992 were a little more
complicated, because the change in the exclusivity term was
accompanied by a sales cap. An approved orphan drug was
guaranteed exclusivity for a period of two years. After two years, if
at any time during the next seven years, the total revenue from the
orphan drug exceeded $200 million, the exclusivity term would be
revoked. 178 Thus, the Amendments extended the term for most
orphan drugs to nine years, while reducing the term on the most
successful drugs to as little as two years. The authors of the
Amendments believed that this change to the Act would not seriously
affect the operation of the Act as ninety-seven percent of orphan
drugs never even approach the $200 million threshold.179 They
further argued that no company would decline to market an orphan
drug product just because it would face competition after its sales
reached $200 million. 180 Neither the 1992 nor the 1994 Amendments
were brought to a vote in Congress.
The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), an umbrella
group for many biotechnology companies, proposed reducing the
176. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3) (1994)) (market exclusivity
provisions).
177. See 140 CONG. REc. S3684, S3728 (daily ed. March 24, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum discussing the provisions of the Orphan Drug Act Amendments of 1994, S. 1981 &
H.R. 4160).
178. See S. REP. No. 102-358, at *2 (1992) (1992 WL 193619) (report on S. 2060 Orphan
Drug Amendments of 1992). The Amendments also provided transition rules for approved and
pending orphan drugs, as well as challenge provisions for manufacturers who wished to prove
that their costs had not been recovered at $200 million. See id. at *8.
179. See id. at*2.
180. See id. at *6.
ORPHAN DRUG ACT
term to five years, with the opportunity to apply for a five-year
extension if the drug had "limited commercial potential." To be
eligible for the extension, the drug would need to be for a disease that
affected fewer than 100,000 patients. 181 This proposal was never
formally introduced in Congress, but it may have influenced the 1994
Amendments.182
The main problem with these amendments is that they return to
the failed system of the 1983 Act, which tried to force drug
companies to release development costs to get protection. Thus, the
effect of the 1994 provisions would be to reduce the incentive to a
four year market exclusivity provision, as drug companies will be
reluctant to apply for the extra three years. The situations are not
entirely analogous, as the 1983 Act required- the projection of future
costs while the 1994 Amendments only required information about
incurred costs. However, these costs are still very difficult to
compute, particularly if the drug is being investigated for more than
one indication or disease, or in more than one country, and the costs
must be allocated among the indications and countries. Drug makers
also have a difficult time allocating overhead costs, and the crucial
issue of recouping the costs incurred in developing drugs that
ultimately fail as pharmaceuticals remains unresolved.183 All of these
factors are likely to have the effect of forcing drug companies to view
the market exclusivity as a four-year term, which would have grave
consequences on the incentive structure. The BIO proposal suffers
from a similar difficulty.
The provisions of the 1992 Amendments are more in the nature
of a revocation of exclusivity, and therefore will be discussed in the
next part.
c. Revocation of Exclusivity
A third popular type of amendment is the revocation of
exclusivity based on a trigger event. One type of proposed trigger
event is keyed to achieving a given level of either sales or profits.
Profit measures are notoriously difficult to compute and enforce,
especially since drug companies prefer to keep this information
181. See Orphan Drug Amendment Proposal Reduces Market Exclusivity, 55 F.D.C. REP.
("The Pink Sheet") (June 21, 1993) (available on Westlaw, FDC-RPTS database).
182. See 140 CoNG. REC. S3684, S3728 (daily ed. March 24, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum indicating the support of BIO for the Amendments which contained similar wording
to the BIO proposal).
183. See Scotchmer, supra note 164, at 282, 287 (stressing the need to account for R & D
failures in determining intellectual property protection).
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secret, and therefore drug companies are unlikely to use any system
that requires them to reveal it.184 Levels of sales, however, are much
easier to track and less likely to make drug companies nervous.185
The 1992 Amendments proposed a sales level of $200 million as an
appropriate trigger event. 186
Although sales triggers are much easier to administer than profit
triggers, they are also much less accurate. Drugs vary greatly in their
development, production, and incidental costs (see the discussion of
the very expensive drug Ceredase in Part mll.A.l.a, supra), and so a
sales cap will have very different effects on different drugs. A profit
cap accounts for these differing cost levels and thereby puts each drug
developer in the same relative position. One commentator, Sanders,
asks, "Is a $200 million [sales] cap fair for the company that invests
$195 million in development, when it applies equally to the company
that invests $50 million?" 187 The amount at which the cap is set is
also questionable. Given the average cost to develop a new drug is
$360 million,188 is a $200 million cap reasonable? If the proposed
cap is too low, then it runs up against the same problem as the split
exclusivity term: it destroys the incentive structure of the Act because
drug companies wil only be able to earn profits if they provide cost
and profit information to the FDA to demonstrate that they have spent
more than the cap, and drug companies are reluctant to do anything
that requires them to provide this data to the FDA. 189
Alternatively, an increase in the affected population to more than
200,000 people might be the trigger event. This provision has proved
quite popular (it appeared in the Amendments of 1990,190 1991,191
184. This is especially true in this era of frequent Congressional discussions of price
controls on pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. H658-59 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1993)
(excerpt of debate on establishing a Prescription Drug Price Review Board).
185. See 137 CONG. REC. S18366-67 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum on S. 2060 Orphan Drug Amendments of 1991 (later the Orphan Drug Amendments
of 1992)) (discussing the sales/profits distinction).
186. See S. REP. No. 102-358, at *2 (1992) (1992 WL 193619) (report on S. 2060 Orphan
Drug Amendments of 1992).
187. Sanders, supra note 119, at 2624.
188. See Anders, supra note 24, at B1.
189. See supra Part lI1.A.2.b. The relatively small size of the cap might not be a real
problem for orphan drugs, since they have cost advantages provided by the Act's other
incentives (tax credits, grants, protocol assistance) and the clinical tests require smaller
populations. See supra text accompanying note 26.
190. See H.R. REP. No. 101-635, at *4 (1990) (1990 WL 259270) (report on H.R. 4638
Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990).
191. See 137 CONG. REc. S18366-67 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (remarks of Sen.
Kassebaum introducing S. 2060 Orphan Drug Amendments of 1991).
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1992,192 and 1994193), probably because it is congruent with the Act's
basic presumption that drugs for conditions that affect more than
200,000 people will be profitable. Intuitively, the time at which this
occurs should not matter to the presumption; either enough people are
affected or they are not.
A related type of amendment, which might be viewed as
somewhat of a "pre-approval revocation," is a requirement that
orphan disease-affected populations be projected three years into the
future. This provision appeared in the same group of Amendments as
the population trigger.194 Both of these provisions are essentially
aimed at the expanding orphan diseases discussed in Part Ull.A.l.d,
supra. They are intended to prevent AIDS-type situations, where
everyone could see that (tragically) the affected population would
cross the 200,000 barrier in a few years, resulting in presumably
profitable drugs, but the FDA was powerless to stop issuing
designations under the terms of the Act.195
These provisions seem to be reasonable enough; they are
unlikely to change the Act's incentive structure significantly. The
three-year projection requirement makes particular sense, as it would
have reduced the problem with profitable AIDS orphans much faster.
As indicated earlier, these amendments comport with the assumption
underlying the use of the 200,000 figure in the first place. As
commentators Rin-Laures & Janofsky have indicated, a manufacturer
that will have its exclusivity revoked because the affected population
has passed 200,000 should be allowed to demonstrate that the drug
remains unprofitable at the higher population, as is provided in the
Act itself,196 so as to preserve its exclusivity. 197
d. Windfall Profit Taxes
Another approach for limiting the profitable orphans (regardless
of why they are profitable) is a windfall profit tax on all revenues
above a certain level. This approach is particularly popular with
Representative Stark from California, who introduces variations on it
192. See S. REP. No. 102-358, at *3 (1992) (1992 WL 193619) (report on S. 2060 Orphan
Drug Amendments of 1992).
193. See S. REP. No. 103-366, at *2 (1994) (1994 WL 514508) (report on S. 1981 Orphan
Drug Amendments of 1994).
194. See references cited supra notes 190-193.
195. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1994) (population measured as of date of request for
designation).
196. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2)(B) (1994).
197. See Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 281.
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at regular intervals.
The first proposal was the Orphan Drug Windfall Profits Tax of
1990.198 This proposal allows drug companies to recapture twice the
development costs of the orphan drug plus a twenty-five percent
profit before the windfall profit tax goes into effect. 199 "The figure of
25 percent is chosen because it is a comfortable estimate of the
average market profit for the brand prescription drug industry." 200
Rep. Stark reintroduced the same bill the next year as the Orphan
Drug Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1991,201 and a changed version of
the bill later in 1991.202 This changed version of the bill called for a
seventy-five percent tax on all profits once development costs had
been recovered (leaving the manufacturer with a twenty-five percent
profit). Finally, in 1993, Rep. Stark introduced a modified version of
this latter windfall tax proposal again. 203 The modified proposal
called for a windfall profit tax of seventy-five percent on all profits
over 125% of production costs, but only after all development costs
had been recovered. None of these windfall tax proposals appears to
have generated much support within Congress.
In theory, a windfall profit tax seems like a good way to
accomplish what Rep. Stark intended to accomplish; it limits the
profits on orphan drugs. However, once again these proposals run
contrary to the practices of drug companies which work very hard to
keep information like this confidential. It also, once again, brings out
the need to account for developmental, production and marketing
costs - the cumbersome provision that led to the failure of the
original Orphan Drug Act.204  Further, the tax has a similar
dampening effect as a sales cap although it does meet the objection of
limiting everyone equally. Finally, a less-than-100% tax leaves the
manufacturer with the incentive to charge high prices, which may
even lead to higher prices as the tax is passed along to consumers.205
198. See 136 CONG. REc. H6194 (daily ed. July, 31, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Stark
introducing the Orphan Drug Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1990).
199. See idE
200. Id.
201. See 137 CONG. REc. E1171 (daily ed. April 10, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Stark
reintroducing the Orphan Drug Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1991).
202. See 137 CONG. REc. H7777 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Stark
introducing a new version of the Orphan Drug Windfall Profits Tax Act).
203. See 139 CONG. REc. H1851 (daily ed. April 1, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Stark regarding
amendments to the Orphan Drug Windfall Profits Tax Act).
204. See Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 284-85.
205. See id. at 285.
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3. The Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990
Congress passed the Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990.206 The
Amendments would have implemented shared exclusivity, revocation
of exclusivity if the target population passed 200,000 people,
projection of population for three years, and other miscellaneous
changes. However, the Amendments passed late in the session, and
President Bush pocket-vetoed them. In his Memorandum of
Disapproval, he stated:
I have serious concerns about the effect H.R. 4638 would have
upon the incentives of drug companies to develop orphan drugs. I
believe we must not endanger the success of this program, which is
due to large measure to the existence of the "market exclusivity"
provision in the Orphan Drug Act that allows companies to have
exclusive marketing rights to an orphan drug for 7 years.
Weakening the current 7-year exclusivity period would certainly
discourage development of desperately needed new orphan
drugs. 207
B. Ineffective Tax Credits
1. The Problem
The Orphan Drug Act provides a tax credit for fifty percent of
the amount of money spent on clinical trials.208 The problem with the
tax credit is the opposite of the problem with the market exclusivity
- it is not working well enough. Several aspects of the drug industry
and specific provisions of the tax credit interact in a way that makes
the credits ineffective. First, the credit applies only to human clinical
trials, not to animal trials, which are also very expensive. Second, the
credit cannot be carried forward to future tax years or backward to
past tax years. This is a particular problem for small biotechnology
companies, which often have no revenue and therefore no tax liability
while they are carrying out the research that qualifies for the credits;
without taxes to pay, tax credits are worthless. Similarly, the credit is
not refundable, which would be an alternative way to get the money
to biotechnology companies having no tax liabilities. 209 Finally, the
206. See H.R. REP. No. 101-635, at *4 (1990) (1990 WL 259270) (report on H.R. 4638
Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990).
207. 137 CONG. REc. H73-74 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991) (H.R. 4638-Memorandum of
Disapproval).
208. See 26 U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. II 1994).
209. See Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 295 (discussing all these difficulties);
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provision granting the credit requires that the company be "carrying
on a business," which again may be problematic for small
biotechnology companies that do not yet have products to sell.
Another problem, not unique to the drug industry, is that the credit
needs periodic legislative renewal, but Congress does not always
renew it promptly and the credit occasionally lapses.210
2. The Proposed Solution
Congress has chosen to solve several of these problems in direct
fashion. First in 1995,211 and now again more recently,212 bills were
introduced to make the tax credit permanent and allow the credit to be
carried backward or forward. These Amendments will certainly make
the tax credit more effective and more reliable.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY, PERSONALIZED DRUGS, AND OTHER ECLECTIC
FRAGMENTS
A. Constitutionality
John Flynn has made the interesting argument that the Orphan
Drug Act is an unconstitutional exercise of the patent power.213 He
argues that Congress has used the commerce clause to grant a patent-
type right that could not be granted under the patent clause, which
makes the Act an impermissible evasion of the patent clause. Since
many of the approved orphan drugs ate already known to be effective
for the illnesses they treat, they cannot qualify as a "discovery" as
required under the patent clause, and hence the granting of a patent-
type right is unconstitutional.214
Flynn may be correct in his analysis. However, without going
into the problem in any real depth, an alternative possible
interpretation is possible. Flynn essentially interprets the
Clissold, supra note 154, at 145; see generally David M. Richardson, The Orphan Drug Tax
Credit: An Inadequate Response to an Ill-Defined Problem, 6 AM. J. TAX POLy 135, 180-86
(1987).
210. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 45C(e)(1), 45C(e)(2) (Supp. 1994) (credit lapsed between Dec. 31,
1994, and July 1, 1996; credit expired again May 31, 1997).
211. See 141 CONG. REC. E939 (daily ed. May 3, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Nancy Johnson
introducing the Orphan Drug Tax Credit Amendments of 1995).
212. See 143 CONG. REc. E550 (daily ed. March 21, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Nancy
Johnson); 143 CONG. REC. S1191-92 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1997) (introducing S. 293).
213. See Flynn, supra note 10. From the tone of the article, Flynn just does not like the Act
and has found a novel way to attack it.
214. This is a gross simplification of a very complex argument.
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constitutional patent clause as including all the terms of the patent
statutes, incorporating their precise statutory definitions as interpreted
in judicial decisions. However, this reading is not necessarily
compelled by the Constitution. Stepping back and taking a more
liberal view of "discovery," for the limited purpose of the Orphan
Drug Act, the holder of the exclusive marketing right has arguably
"discovered," via clinical trials, that the compound is safe and
effective in humans. Before the trials, the drug is not allowed to be
used in humans; after the trials, it is. Arguably, the drug that is shown
to be safe and effective in people is "new" relative to the drug before
it was so shown. The investigator has certainly "discovered"
something new. It might be debatable whether or not that "discovery"
is sufficiently "new" to satisfy the constitutional imperative, but the
argument that it is "new" is at least plausible.215
B. Impact of "Personalized Drugs"
A recent article in Science raises a whole new set of questions
about the future of the whole orphan drug program.216 The article
describes "pharmacogenetics," which is the science of linking
people's genes to the differences in the way they respond to drugs.
The ultimate goal of pharmacogenetics is to tailor drugs to specific
genetic subgroups of the population, thereby increasing their
effectiveness. The article presented the concern of some drug
companies that "pharmacogenetics will shrink the market for a
particular drug by limiting who can take it."217 This statement raises
the specter of a day when essentially all drugs are "orphans" under the
current definition. Pharmacogenetics is a long way from achieving
this end, if it can be achieved at all, but the possible implications for
the Orphan Drug Act are fascinating.
C. The "Off-Label Use" Issue
A common concern raised by many commentators is that a drug
that is approved and has exclusivity for an orphan disease indication
will be found to have a significant off-label use that will drastically
215. For a related argument on the difficulties with applying the standard patent
requirements to biotechnology inventions see Karen I. Boyd, Nonobviousness and the
Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a Doctrine of Economic Nonobviousness, 12 BERKELEY
TECH L.J. 311 (1997) (arguing for a- doctrine of "economic nonobviousness" rather than
"technical nonobviousness" in biotechnology).
216. See Jon Cohen, Developing Prescriptions with a Personal Touch, 275 SacENcE, Feb.
7, 1997, at 776.
217. Id.
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increase its market size. Because it has market exclusivity, the story
goes, the maker will not attempt to get approval for the off-label use
because the second market would not be protected, and competition in
this second market would destroy the exclusivity in the orphan market
as wel. 218 However, if the off-label indication really represents a
viable market, another company will certainly step in to serve it,
obtaining FDA approval for its own version of the drug for this
second indication. In the process, the original orphan market will also
be destroyed, because the market exclusivity provision cannot be used
to stop the sale of drugs approved for the second indication for off-
label use on the orphan indication. Thus, a viable off-label use should
actually serve to increase competition. The only time this might not
occur would be if the second market was too small to justify anyone's
effort to get approval. However, then by definition it would be an
orphan market, and the off-label use would be an orphan use - and
this type of use would certainly not be inconsistent with the Act.
Thus, the concern over off-label use is not justified and should not be
considered a valid argument against market exclusivity.
D. Cases
Most of the battles surrounding the Orphan Drug Act have been
fought in Congress, the FDA, or scholarly journals, and very few
cases have reached the courts. The first case to do so was Genentech
v. Bowen.219 Genentech discussed the Act and its history at great
length in deciding that the recombinant hGH made by Eli Lilly,
Genentech's rival, was not the "same drug" as the old cadaver-derived
hGH that already had FDA approval (the case did not hold, as some
commentators report, that Lilly's hGH was different from Genentech's
hGH by virtue of being one amino acid shorter; the court expressly
declined to decide this issue). 220 The court also subtly reprimanded
the FDA for not yet having published regulations. 221 However,
almost another six years elapsed before the Regulations were
finalized in 1993. Since the Regulations went into effect, the
importance of Genentech has diminished. A similar case would now
be decided under the Regulations.
218. See Arno et al., supra note 5, at 240; Janice M. Hogan, Revamping the Orphan Drug
Act: Potential Impact on the World Pharmaceutical Market, 26 LAW & POLY INTL BUS. 523,
533 (1995); Thomas, supra note 52, at 429-30.




The next case to discuss the Act was Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp. v. Amgen, Inc.222 However, the Act was just a sidelight of what
was essentially a contract case, and the court said nothing of interest
about the Act.
Two recent cases are more interesting. The first is Berlex Lab. v.
Food and Drug Admin.223 The case revolved around the FDA's
approval of an interferon made by Biogen. Berlex claimed that the
approval of Biogen's interferon violated its exclusivity in its own
interferon, challenging the FDA's finding of clinical superiority.224
The Court held that Berlex had standing to sue the FDA, 225 but held,
in an opinion very deferential to the FDA's designation process, that
the FDA had an adequate basis for its decision and so ruled against
Berlex on the merits.226
The final case involving the Act is Braintree Lab., Inc. v.
Nephro-Tech, Inc.,227 'an unpublished decision from Kansas.
Braintree had a drug with market exclusivity. Nephro-Tech sold a
competing version of the same drug as a "dietary supplement" without
FDA approval.228 Being unable to sue directly under the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Braintree submitted a set of patent, unfair
competition, and common law tortious interference claims, as well as
a claim for a violation of "property rights to seven years exclusivity
under the Orphan Drug Act."229  The Court dismissed all of the
claims as an impermissible attempt to evade the prohibition against an
individual's suing directly under the FDCA.230 This case might give
pause to any orphan drug exclusivity holder, who would thus seem to
be unable to enforce its rights in court. However, Braintree probably
should have instead first gone directly to the FDA and requested
action. Then, if the FDA still refused to act, Braintree could have
filed suit against the FDA, not directly against Nephro-Tech.
E. Biotechnology Protection
A surprising number of commentators have noted that the
222. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1989).
223. Berlex Lab., Inc. v. Food and Drug Admin., 942 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1996).
224. See iL at 23.
225. See id at 24-25.
226. See id at 23-24.
227. Braintree Lab., Inc. v. Nephro-Tech, Inc., No. 96-2459-JWL, 1997 WL 94237 (D.
Kan. Feb. 26, 1997).
228. See id. at *1.
229. Md. at *1-2.
230. See id. at *6-7.
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Orphan Drug Act has, to some degree, become a sort of patent
substitute for biotechnological inventions.231 This practice has arisen
from the uncertain state of patent protection for these inventions and
the complexities of obtaining such protection. Preparation of an
application for obtaining Orphan Drug Act exclusivity is much less
onerous than prosecution of a patent for a protein or other
biotechnology invention. Requests for orphan drug designation are
straightforward, involving only the compilation and submission of
information to the FDA, as provided in the Regulations. 232 Patent
prosecution, on the other hand, requires a lengthy process of drafting
and filing an application that explains the invention and then
convincing the Patent and Trademark Office that the invention meets
the statutory requirements for patentability.233 The absolute term of
Orphan Drug Act's protection, seven years, is shorter than that of
patent protection, twenty years. 234 However, a biotechnology patent's
term begins when the patent application is filed, and the time taken in
patent prosecution and then clinical trials, subtracts from the effective
term. The term for orphan drug exclusivity, on the other hand, does
not start until the drug is approved. The net effect is that the length of
protection is about even, or may even favor exclusivity. On the other
hand, orphan drug exclusivity does not have the versatility of a patent,
and the uncertain status of biotechnology patents is slowly being
resolved. However, when used for the limited purposes to which the
Act is suited, orphan drug exclusivity can be a potent patent
substitute. 235
F. Other Applications of the Orphan Drug Act Concept
The Orphan Drug Act has been so successful at encouraging the
231. See Arno et al., supra note 5, at 236; Marlene E. Haffner, Orphan Products-Ten
Years Later and Then Some, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 593, 599-600 (1994); Joseph A. Levitt &
John V. Kelsey, The Orphan Drug Regulations and Related Issues, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525,
531 (1993); Shulman et al., supra note 38, at 366; Jess G. Thoene, Curing the Orphan Drug
Act, 251 SCIENCE, Mar. 8, 1991 at 1158. Even Congress has criticized this phenomenon. See S.
REP. No. 102-358, at *6-7 (1992) (1992 WL 193619) (report on S. 2060 Orphan Drug
Amendments of 1992).
232. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.20 (1998).
233. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994).
234. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
235. An entire article could be written on this subject, exploring how it came about and
comparing the provisions of the two systems, particularly the scope of coverage. The FDA's
proposed rules provide an excellent account of the various possibilities the FDA considered for
defining the scope of protection, as contained in the "same drug" definitions. See Orphan Drug
Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 3338, 3341-43 (1991) (proposed Jan. 29, 1991). For analysis from
the patent side, see generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 134.
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development of. drugs for rare diseases that .many people wish to
replicate that success in other areas. For example: Congress has
proposed to use the Act's concepts to help the development of drugs
to treat addiction236 and the development of pesticides for use with
minor crops. 237 Geneticists have proposed a category of "orphan
tests" for diagnosing people with rare diseases.238 Environmentalists
have discussed using the concept to help facilitate the development of
environmental technologies. 239 Medical professionals have suggested
applying the concepts to medical records systems240  and
contraceptive technologies. 241 The Act has even influenced other
countries to pass similar legislation.242
In a similar vein, some have suggested using the Orphan Drug
Act as a model for legislation supporting the development of drugs
that improve global health.243 However, the Act as it is written is
already intended to do this. Some commentators have pointed to the
fact that a disease might be rare in the U.S. but widespread elsewhere
as a flaw in the Act, since the true affected population would then be
greater than 200,000 and drug companies would thus have sufficient
incentive to develop the drug even without the incentives of the
Act.244 However, this is not a true flaw for two reasons. First, most
of these large potential markets are in the developing world, where
money for health care is scarce. A large potential market for a drug is
irrelevant if those comprising that market lack the resources to
purchase the drug. Second, Congress considered the issue of orphan
236. See S. REP. No. 101-476, (1990) (1990 WL 201726) (report on the Drug and Alcohol
Abuse Treatment and Prevention Improvement Act of 1990); see also 142 CONG. REC. S9742-
9744 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1996) (S. 2051 Pharmacotherapy Development Act).
237. See 136 CONG. REC. S5982 (daily ed. May 10, 1990) (statements of Sen. Graham
referring to the program as "an orphan-drug program for agricultural chemicals").
238. See Leslie G. Biesecker, Orphan Tests, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 300,
300(1996).
239. See Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to
Foster the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
3, 13-14 (1996).
240. See Stephen C. Schoenbaum & G. Octo Barnett, Automated Ambulatory Medical
Records Systems: An Orphan Technology, 8 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 598
(1992).
241. See Lisa Kaeser et al., Contraceptives: On Their Own, 8 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT
HEALTH CARE 658 (1992).
242. See Mike Ward, E.C.'s Orphan Drug Proposal, 6 BIOCENTURY, Aug. 3, 1998 at A9
(1998); see generally Cavalier, supra note 122 (comparing the U.S., Japan and Europe).
243. See Patricia C. Kuszler, Balancing the Barriers: Exploiting and Creating Incentives to
Promote Development of New Tuberculosis Treatments, 71 WASH. L. REv. 919, 965 (1996).
244. See Thomas, supra note 52, at 429; Buday, supra note 123, at 83.
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drugs with large worldwide patient populations but small U.S. patient
populations, and deliberately decided to limit the definition to the
affected population in the U.S.245 Congress was quite willing to have
the program serve as a mechanism to help develop treatments for
diseases such as malaria that were prevalent in areas of the world that
could not afford to develop such treatments, but that were still rare in
the U.S. This aspect of the program has had its successes as well,
developing products for treating malaria, leprosy, and African
sleeping sickness.246
V. CONCLUSION
After some early fine tuning, and more recently the publication
of the Regulations, the Orphan Drug Act has become a paragon of
legislative virtue: it does exactly what it is supposed to do and it does
it exceptionally well. It has brought forth treatments for rare diseases
in unprecedented numbers and given a new level of hope to millions
of people.
The Act has also been highly criticized. Most of the criticism
stems from the existence of a few "blockbuster" drugs that have
earned huge profits for their owners. These drugs, for the most part,
arose from unique circumstances (AZT and pentamidine in response
to the AIDS epidemic) or because of early mistakes in administering
the Act (EPO submarketing). Most of these troubling drugs are now
no longer protected, and, judging from the recent literature, few new
ones have replaced them. Meanwhile, the Orphan Drug Act continues
to deliver drugs for rare conditions.
As one long-term proponent of the Act observes, too much
attention has been focused on the public costs of the Orphan Drug Act
- and not enough on the public benefits. 247 As more drugs become
available, each person's risk of being diagnosed with an untreatable
disease decreases. The costs of successfully treating many rare
diseases, while high, are more than recouped in other health care
savings and fuller societal participation of those with orphan diseases.
"As just one example, patients with Parkinson's disease who can slow
their disease progression with the orphan drug selegiline may save the
245. See H.R. REP. No. 97-840, pt. 1, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3577,
3581 (report on P.L. 97-414 Orphan Drug Act).
246. See Haffner, supra note 231, at 600.
247. See Asbury, supra note 159, at 897. The Act has also played a part in the
rehabilitation of thalidomide, a drug long in disfavor. See Lisa Seachrist, EntreMed Winds
Orphan Drug Status For Thalidomide In KS, 9 BIOWORLD ToDAY, August 21, 1998 at I
(1998).
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public $10 million per week by delaying the initiation of disability
payments and by providing tax revenues while they continue to
work." 248
Despite this success, the discussions in Part Ill.A, supra,
demonstrate that Congress frequently threatens to change the way the
Orphan Drug Act works. These threats have led to a high level of
uncertainty in the drug industry, and a certain leeriness about relying
on the Act; some companies have even stopped filing for
designation. 249 Congress and the President need to decide once and
for all what they want the Orphan Drug Act to be, then amend it that
way and leave it alone. Or, better yet, just leave it alone now, as it is,
and let it continue to do the job that it has done so well: getting drugs
for rare diseases to market. Fortunately, this "reform" activity seems
to have died down in the last few years; it should stay that way.
The situation of the Orphan Drug Act seems to lend itself to
clich6s - if it's not broken, don't fix it;250 don't throw the orphan out
with the bathwater; 25 1 don't cut off your nose to spite your face.252 A
better conclusion is provided by David Kessler, then-Commissioner
of the FDA, "'[wie must not tinker with this very successful act .... I
don't think we know enough about these market forces to make
certain any changes we make will not hurt."' 253
248. Asbury, supra note 159, at 897.
249. See Sanders, supra note 119, at 2624-25 (A "shadow of uncertainty" leading to "a
chilling effect on research and development into orphan drugs is already being felt."); Rin-
Laures & Janofsky, supra note 7, at 295; Clissold, supra note 154, at 141.
250. See Sanders, supra note 119, at2625.
251. See Carey & Hamilton, supra note 102, at 38.
252. The author's contribution.
253. Sanders, supra note 119, at 2625.
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